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The Challenge of Technology Competitiveness
in the United States
Deborah L. Wince-Smith*
A study of the rise and fall of civilizations will reveal that those socie-
ties at the forefront of domesticating agriculture and metallurgy,
and who developed new technology, had a comparative advantage over
their competitors. That study will also show that societies who failed to
utilize their technological assets and tools over time lost their advan-
tage in terms of economic, political and military power. As we move
into the twenty-first century, we are on the threshold of profound politi-
cal and economic changes occurring throughout the globe where a na-
tion's technology capabilities and resources are going to play a pivotal
role in wealth creation, high quality jobs, quality of life, and security in
the broadest sense.New technology is reshaping every product, service and job. It is
providing us with capabilities that we could have only imagined at one
time. We have witnessed traditional modes of production, pioneered at
the turn of the century by Henry Ford and Alfred Sloan, the so-called
Taylorist model of production, become obsolete. In parallel, we have
begun to recognize that the management and work organization sys-
tems that parallel these obsolete production systems have to be com-
pletely changed as well.
The merger of civilian and military technologies, the debate about
so called "dual use" technologies, is no longer a meaningful debate. We
all accept that emerging technologies have multiple applications that
cut across industrial sectors and that require simultaneous or concur-
rent engineering for product realization in today's global market.
Clearly, the nations of the world that most effectively use technol-
ogy, and I emphasize use rather than just develop, will be the nations
that create new wealth, new jobs, growing economies and improve the
overall standard of life for their citizens.
A look at the United States will reveal that we are very blessed in
terms of our scientific and technological resources. We have the world's
most productive scientific and technological enterprise. We have a tre-
mendous network of world class research universities, over 750 national
laboratories, and, of course, industrial facilities and manufacturing op-
erations all over the globe. It would be impossible for any country to
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replicate the scientific and technical infrastructure that exists in the
United States today.
In terms of our national expenditures, we spend, overall, more on
research and development than Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom
and France combined. That is some seventy billion dollars-plus from
the government side, which is matched by similar expenditures in the
private sector. Granted, on the government side, a little over half of
those resources usually have been expended in the military domain of
weapons development and procurement. We are seeing that balance
shift with the new priorities of the Clinton Administration to have more
government resources directed to civilian versus military activities.
Over the last three decades, we learned to our peril that the
United States, at the very pinnacle of its technological dominance and
preeminence, began to lose domestic and global market share in many
of the high technology industries in which we had pioneered and led
the world. Some of the well known examples are in consumer electron-
ics, business and machine tools, and industrial lasers. The semiconduc-
tor area was very threatened in the mid 1980s, but due to a number of
coordinated government actions and private sector initiatives, has re-
bounded. An area that I would like to spend a moment on, because it is
a real paradigm or a "Catch 22", of structural problems in the U.S.,
concerns the flat panel display industry.
In the United States we have performed all the underlying, funda-
mental research for what are now three to four multiple technology
paths for flat panel displays. Displays are going to be at the heart of
every information application that has a display requirement. This in-
cludes end-use computers, telecommunication systems of all kinds, the
cockpits of aircraft, medical imaging equipment, and entertainment
systems, etc. However, in the United States today, we do not have a
significant manufacturing capability to produce displays for their mul-
tiple end uses. Our domestic producers are serving specialized defense
applications and, in many cases, constitute small, fragile en-
trepreneurial firms. For the most part, our big end users of displays
obtain their supplies or components from their direct systems competi-
tors in Japan. This fact was highlighted during Desert Storm. Pursuant
to the Defense Surge Production Act, the U.S. Government had to go
to foreign embassies, in this case the Japanese Embassy, and ask them
to go back to their industry to certify whether or not Japanese indus-
trial producers would provide the U.S. military with display needs for
twenty-year-old weapon systems. Experts estimate that displays are a
multi-billion dollar market that is going to determine ultimately the
entire integration of the food chain for information systems. For exam-
ple, some experts have noted that as today's technology develops, the
microprocessors for electronic systems are now being embedded in the
glass displays themselves. If you cannot produce the glass in a high-
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volume, cost-competitive way and have that market, you are going to
ultimately see your underlying electronics base threatened as well.
We had a meeting on this issue a few years ago in the Commerce
Department where one of our small producers put up a quote from the
chairman of Toshiba which said that Toshiba is determined to be the
world's leader in flat panel displays. Toshiba was not concerned how
much it would cost, or how long it would take, or whether they would
make a profit in twenty years. That is the type of competition that is
very difficult for U.S. firms to match given the economic system in
which our firms must operate.
Our challenge, without question, is to take technology, from
whatever source, and translate it into world-class goods and services
and capture the wealth it produces in order to have the resources
needed to tackle our national needs. In this country we are not going to
be able to address health care reform, education, the drug problem, the
environment, or national infrastructure if we do not produce wealth. As
we learned in the former Soviet Union, it is not enough to just produce
jobs.
In short, we have to forge a "commercialization machine" that
propels a seamless, integrated system that moves technology swiftly
from the laboratory to the marketplace, cycle after cycle. This process
has to extend beyond the walls of the private corporation to encompass
a very complex mix of interrelated factors on which industry's ability to
commercialize technology and capture the markets it embodies ulti-
mately depends. Such factors really have nothing to do with technology
per se, and that from a policy perspective as controlled by non-technol-
ogists. Many technology policy experts believe that if government just
spends more money on civilian R&D, that somehow the U.S. is going
to become more competitive in world markets. Moreover, these same
policy experts do not understand or make any effort to engage those
other sets of issues or factors that are far more important to the com-
mercial realization of U.S. R&D assets.
What are these issues? The first concerns the economic, tax, and
regulatory environment in which a U.S. firm has to operate at home
and, of course, abroad. That would include such areas as the govern-
ment's procurement process, anti-trust policies, the tax code, its incen-
tives and disincentives, the structure and organization of our banking
system, and the management of intellectual property rights ("IPR"),
including domestic and global IPR laws and practices.
Let me mention IPR in the context of Japan. Increasingly, we are
seeing a number of serious intellectual property disputes between U.S.
and Japanese companies with serious big time economic stakes. Part of
the problem is that their patent system is very different from ours and
has developed over time as another tool to provide protection and ad-
vantages to Japanese companies. In Japan, a first to file patent system
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exists versus a first to invent, with applications immediately published
upon filing. A sequential intervention system can then begin and hold
up the final issuance of a foreign patent until the term of its coverage is
meaningless. The GAO will issue this summer a report based on a
study of how Japanese IPR practices have hurt U.S. companies. One
particular case concerned the Government of Japan's refusal between
1955 and 1987 to implement a patent secrecy agreement with the U.S.
Government. As a result, many of our patent filings for dual use tech-
nologies that had secrecy orders placed on them for security reasons
never obtained patent coverage in Japan. Indeed, it was not until the
Japanese were interested in participating in the Strategic Defense Initi-
ative (SDI) program that the U.S. Government finally concluded a pat-
ent secrecy agreement with the Government of Japan in 1988. Intellec-
tual property rights regimes have a very significant impact on the
technology innovation process and most importantly, the realization of
wealth from new products. The GATT negotiations under the Uruguay
Round of Trade Talks on IPR are very important to the U.S.
Another issue concerns the way industries are structured and, col-
laborate among themselves domestically and internationally. We have
heard quite a bit, during this conference, about the business, manage-
ment and manufacturing practices employed by private firms that im-
pact quality, labor-management relationships, trade, export control pol-
icies, and other arenas. Much academic research has documented how
the Japanese and other nations have protected their home markets until
their domestic industries have reached a certain state of development
and are "ready to compete" and how this home market protection has
impacted U.S. firms adversely.
Let me now turn to the topic of the roles of government and indus-
try in technology innovation. Government and industry have very im-
portant responsibilities to play that are complimentary in fostering a
system that will allow the private sector to maximize its deployment of
technology and create wealth. There is no question that government
has to foster a long-term "risk oriented" not "risk adverse" environ-
ment for investment in which the private sector can translate technol-
ogy into competitive goods and services.
Earlier this year, a very interesting report was put out by Ernst &
Young entitled the "Industrial Policy and American Competitiveness
Survey," based on a survey undertaken in December 1992. Interest-
ingly enough, the majority of U.S. corporate respondents indicated that
the most important needs for them were not government subsidies and
increased expenditures for R&D, but dealing with the tax, regulatory
and environmental policies that enable them to invest in new product
development and successfully compete in world markets with short
product cycles.
I will elaborate on a couple of those factors. Clearly, tax and eco-
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nomic policies affect the cost and availability of capital. Businesses
need to justify long term R&D, product development, and production.
We heard from a previous speaker that there is no capital gains tax in
Japan. We still cannot reach a consensus in the U.S. that capital gains
taxes are not a rich versus poor issue. The Bush Administration had
proposed to make the research and experimentation tax credit perma-
nent. Every year Congress would renew the credit, but never make it
permanent. The Clinton Administration has also made that proposal a
key part of the economic program they just announced.'
One adverse economic problem that has just emerged in the Clin-
ton plan is the newly-proposed tax on royalty income. There is real
concern from high-tech business leaders about the adverse impact of
this tax. Interestingly, it appears that this tax proposal came from the
Treasury Department with little analysis of its implications for other
major components of the President's agenda, i.e., supporting R&D in-
vestment and U.S. high-tech industry. This tax would require a new
treatment for merging royalty and dividend income. This treatment,
without going into the details, would have two impacts. One, it would
encourage U.S. firms to do their R&D overseas. And secondly, it would
cost major companies, under intense financial pressures, millions of dol-
lars in additional taxes. This is a case in which one of our strong assets,
intellectual property portfolios, would be taxed to the point they be-
come a liability.
One area in which the Bush Administration was very farsighted
but, unfortunately, did a poor job of packaging is the matter of banking
reform. The debate on banking reform has practically disappeared al-
though most studies on capital formation and short-term investment
horizons recommend significant changes in our Depression era banking
system and the ownership ties between providers and users of capital.
In the U.S. we operate in an old fashioned, obsolete banking structure.
In travelling across the country last year through our National Tech-
nology Initiative that brought together technologists, financial provid-
ers, and manufacturers, we never once heard that banks were playing
any significant role in providing risk capital for entrepreneurial and
other technology activity in the United States. Now, of course, if one
looks at the banking systems of Japan and Germany, where financial
entities have an ownership stake in industrial enterprises, behavior and
outcomes are quite different. A personal anecdote will illustrate this
point. My husband is on the board of a German electronics company.
Recently, he came back from a Board Meeting and said that the firm
was planning a major investment in an enabling technology. There was
a lot of debate at the board as to whether or not to proceed in light of
1 This summer, the Congress yet again renewed the R&D tax credit, but did not make it
permanent.
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the risks and long-term return on this investment. He was amazed that
the most active and insistent member of the board, who supported
making the investment and taking the risk, was a member of the
Deutsche Bank. It turns out the Deutsche Bank has an equity owner-
ship stake in this company. I cannot imagine an example of that type
of behavior and outcome occurring in the United States. It is not be-
cause our CEOs and industrialists have a hereditary gene that repli-
cates itself every generation and causes them to be short-term oriented.
Rather, we have created a structural financial system that has divorced
the providers and users of capital and removed the bond, and incentives
of shared ownership.
Banking reform to amend the 1933 Glass Steagell Act and allow a
minimum, but critical ownership linkage between the financial commu-
nity and the industrial community is, in my view, absolutely essential if
we are to make the long term investments required for a success in the
next century. Yet unfortunately, the issue of banking reform has disap-
peared from the economic agenda in the new administration.
Government regulation is another critical area impacting competi-
tiveness. It is a boring topic, and there is not much the President can
do to get any positive publicity out of streamlining or reducing the reg-
ulatory burden placed on U.S. industry. However, there is no question
that government regulation is a key determinant of the time, effort and
money it takes to get a product to market. Dexter Baker, the current
head of the Board of Governors of the National Association of Manu-
facturers and the outgoing CEO of Air Products, has said that U.S.
corporations spend one and a half times more money and effort re-
sponding to the government regulatory environment, than they do on
R&D. That gives you an idea of the staggering amount of economic
resources that we are expending on matters that are not directly sup-
porting national productivity, investment, wealth, and job creation.
We also heard during this conference a discussion about our edu-
cational system and the skills and labor force that we are going to need
to compete globally in the future. That is one area in which I believe
the new administration is going to play a very positive and important
role. Secretary Reich of the Labor Department understands the chal-
lenge of creating a twenty-first century work force and putting in place
the new training systems and labor incentives to reach that goal. It is
going to be very interesting to watch to what extent organized labor is
going to become a full partner with industrial management to effect
these charges essential to the work place of the next century.
Before concluding, allow me to cover one area that is controversial,
and that I hope will engender some debate. We have a whole set of new
enabling technologies. Some call such technologies critical or emerging.
They are really the wealth generators of the next century. They cut
across industrial sectors and have multiple applications. Their develop-
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ment is interdisciplinary, and they are really going to profoundly
change our lives, and how we go about our business. And, to simplify
their complexity, they fall into five broad categories: information, man-
ufacturing, materials, the life sciences, and the environment.
I did not want to challenge my former colleague in the Bush Ad-
ministration, Linn Williams, on the subject of High Definition Televi-
sion. However, to set the record straight, at the end of the Reagan
Administration, there was never any effort underway for the U.S. gov-
ernment to-subsidize a R&D program to support analog HDTV devel-
opment or downstream productions. Those involved on the technology
side knew that what was at issue was the merger of computers and
telecommunications into integrated information systems that would be
totally digitally based. HDTV, in essence, represented the merger of a
broad group of digitally driven compression and display technologies
and, at most, HDTV itself could be an initial test bed in which U.S.
industry could become partners to develop and test those technologies.
In short, HDTV did not represent the desire of technologists for the
U.S. government to subsidize the industrial development of an analog
"big screen" TV for yuppies.
Unfortunately, the HDTV debate was handled very poorly in the
early days of the Bush Administration and in many ways set back the
Administration's efforts to promote technology commercialization in
the private sector. The people who claimed that this debate was about a
government subsidy never took the time and effort to understand the
underlying technology issues involved and why they were important.
The Clinton Administration's Information Infrastructure Initiative is
really the successor to the initial work done in 1987 and 1988 on
HDTV and the Reagan/Bush Administration's work on High Perform-
ance computing. I know that Former Secretary of Commerce, Robert
Mossbacher understood this issue very well and the importance of the
integration of digital information technologies and their profound fu-
ture impact on U.S. industry.
It is not very clear that U.S. industry is going to be able to com-
mercialize these enabling technologies using our traditional investment
approaches and, more importantly, our traditional industrial structure
and linear process of innovation. These technologies are too complex.
One can only return one's investment if the current technology is used
in several applications simultaneously and in applications that cut
across industrial sectors where industrial entities in the U.S. normally
do not collaborate. So, again, how U.S. industry is structured and how
it collaborates internally is very important. If one looks at our foreign
competitors industrial organization and how it impacts enabling tech-
nology development, one sees that U.S. firms are going up* against di-
versified, vertically-integrated, industrial financial giants. Such struc-
tures are integrating the producers and users of technology and
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accomplishing the entire innovation cycle from research, design, manu-
facturing and marketing in a closed proprietary structure. I emphasize
"closed" and "proprietary". These organizations can quickly pool their
resources and share their risks across a wide and diverse product base.
This enables them to capture broad-based returns on the economics of
scale and scope of these technologies. It also allows them to be nimble
or flexible through inter-industry and inter-firm cooperative relation-
ships that allow the introduction of new materials and components si-
multaneously in many different applications and new markets. The re-
sult is that the downstream product lines produce a stable internal
market for the new core emerging technology, and this system repli-
cates itself over time.
In the United States we do not have a tradition of close producer/
supplier relationships. Indeed, it is legally prohibited in many instances.
We joked in the Commerce Department that if we took the criteria of
the Malcolm Baldridge Quality Award, which rewards close producer/
supplier long term relationships, and asked one of our major defense
contractors to follow this criteria in the acquisition procurement activi-
ties for the Department of Defense, they might end up in jail. In fact,
the U.S. Government Procurement System has created a hostile envi-
ronment in the defense contracting world where every year a contractor
must go out and rebid its supplier contracts. Fragmented, unstable, and
destructive relationships are the result. Yet, we know in terms of inno-
vation, manufacturing and quality control, that one needs to nurture
long-term producer/supplier relationships.
In my view, a major challenge for U.S. industry is whether or not
they will be able to cut across sectors and integrate producers and sup-
pliers of these evolving technologies into cooperative teams. This chal-
lenge has a major impact also on defense conversion in the U.S.
One of the programs that we were espousing in the Department of
Commerce and that has been supported by the new administration, will
promote industry-led, vertically-integrated consortia for enabling tech-
nologies. Horizontal consortia bring together competitors, but they are
only the first step of the game. In a horizontal consortia, everybody
does some generic research raising the ceiling of knowledge for all par-
ticipants, but not achieving the proprietary first market entry that is
needed for market success. In concurrent engineering, where R&D, de-
sign, manufacturing and marketing must be linked together, it is highly
unlikely that fierce competitors are going to turn over their proprietary
"crown jewels", as it were, to their direct competitors in a horizontal
consortium.
A vertically-integrated consortium that would link producers and
users around an enabling technology with multiple applications could
perform the entire innovation cycle from R&D through marketing.
Such a structure would accelerate, first to market requirements in a
[Vol. 19:191 1993
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proprietary industrial environment where one's domestic and foreign
competitors are not going to get easy or timely access to your technol-
ogy. For example, partners in a vertically-integrated team to develop
and utilize composite materials, might include an aerospace producer, a
sporting goods manufacturer, an auto manufacturer; an appliance
maker, a direct material supplier and maybe even a computer systems
integrator, because they all need materials for their specific product
applications, but are not direct competitors. Such a team could share
costs, risks, and pull their proprietary input up front, and move forward
with multiple market driven applications. We believe there are no anti-
trust problems in such a structure, and that the ideal scenario would
involve the formation of a number of competing teams, set up around
enabling or critical technologies. Interestingly enough, soon after we
issued our Federal Register Notice for the Strategic Partnership Initia-
tive, we had numerous inquiries from Japan. The Japanese understood
immediately that this was a significant technology organizational and
deployment initiative that would be accomplished if the industries
would identify and draw together the stakeholders they needed to team
with for success.
We have learned in the U.S. that we can have the best technology
asset in the world, and even have the investment financing in place but
if we cannot manufacture the product cost effectively, and deliver high
quality, the other two resources become meaningless for market suc-
cess. By the way, in reference to a comment made at this conference
earlier, I am not yet aware that the Japanese have given up their ambi-
tions to be a global manufacturer in the twenty-first century. To the
contrary, the U.S. and Canada are working very closely on a project
called Intelligent Manufacturing Systems ("IMS") that the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry ("MITI") developed almost three
years ago. Initially, Japanese officials directly approached U.S. univer-
sities and companies and solicited their participation in an R&D pro-
gram on computer integrated manufacturing, software and standards
development. The Governments of Canada and Europe realized that
many of their universities, who were keen to obtain research money,
had given the Japanese the entire road map of their significant research
work through this proposal solicitation process. Over the last two years,
the U.S., Canada, and Europe forged an international feasibility study
IMS that involves the U.S., Canada, Australia, the European Commu-
nity and the EFTA countries. Our goal is to determine how and under
what conditions and structure might work internationally in the devel-
opment and, more importantly, in the deployment of the twenty first
century manufacturing systems. What we have seen now in the United
States is that IMS has been one of the few programs on the horizon
that has forced our producers and users of Intelligent Manufacturing
Systems to come together and collaborate.
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I will close with one anecdote. Two years ago, one summer day in
the Commerce Department, I was called up to the Secretary's suite,
and when one gets the call from the Secretary, one responds quickly. I
was informed that one of the big U.S. manufacturing companies had
been complaining that I was holding up their effort to work with the
Japanese on Intelligent Manufacturing Systems. This company was
concerned about getting market access in Japan and thought such tech-
nology collaboration through R&D input might help open up the Japa-
nese market. Fortunately, that same afternoon, the CEO of a major
U.S. computer firm was in the Department and expressed his concern
over the IMS program, stating that an Assistant Secretary was willing
and very eager for U.S. companies to work with the Japanese in an
area of great U.S. strength that would expose our lead in to our Japa-
nese competitors. Those two desperate views of U.S. industry interests
and conflicting behavior are a classic example of the pressures placed
on government and the fair, brothering role government must play for
the national interest. In this case, we had one whole sector of U.S.
industry anxious to go forward and collaborate with competitors, and
not concerned about the impact such collaboration could have on our
technology assets and other sectors of U.S. industry. The "pro-com-
pany" wanted to use these "IMS" systems, and were willing to trade
technology to get market access which, of course, in the case of Japan,
never is realized. The "no-go" company, from a different industrial sec-
tor, believed such collaboration would be detrimental to their interests
and the country at large and that we should proceed cautiously. I ulti-
mately said to these two groups, "Why don't your CEOs get together
and form a coalition and really be leaders". The response was, "Oh,
our CEOs don't talk together at that level". This story does have a
good ending. For over the last two years, representatives of the two
sectors established the Coalition on Intelligent Manufacturing Systems
("CIMS"), which has brought together the producers and the users of
IMS systems to coordinate their interests and help broker the national
interest. The Canadians have established a parallel industry-led
organization.
I highlight the IMS story to underscore that while we have tre-
mendous technology assets in the North American continent, our
problems still concern the deployment and organizational management
of technology. I often think that competitors must wake up every morn-
ing and say, "please, Americans, do not change your anti-trust laws;
keep your 1933 banking reform laws in place; keep those costly regula-
tions in place on U.S. industry, add more tax burdens to U.S. industry
and small entrepreneurial firms, and please support more commercial
R&D at your universities and national labs so we have access to the
knowledge and new technologies we need to commercialize in our supe-
rior industrial structures."
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Surely, in the United States, as we face the next century, we have
the wisdom and political will to forge a world class environment that
will enable our private sector to flourish and ensure that we use our
formidable technology strengths to create national wealth, rewarding
jobs, and a quality of life for our children.
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